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Introduction 
Look at a map and you will see that the world is divided into states.  Using a basic 
definition, a state is a governing entity that has a monopoly on the use of coercion to make laws 
in a specific area.  States are defined by territories or a set of boundaries that specify where the 
jurisdiction of a state begins and ends.  While the common perception of borders is that they are 
static, in reality, they are quite fluid.  Compare a map of the world in 1950 to a map of the world 
today.  You will see that new states were created, and existing ones have either lost or gained 
territory.  With the fluidity of borders, it is difficult to determine what norms and principles 
should guide the international community when dealing with disputes.  To understand the 
justification of norms, it is imperative to answer the basic question: Why can the borders of 
states change?  Political philosophers have sought to answer this question, justifying the 
authority of the state in ways ranging from a divine right to the social contract.  While much 
discussion exists on the topic of territorial justice, there remain many issues to be solved. 
 One way that borders change is through secession, typically to create a new, separate 
state.  Although common enough in history, it poses a significant problem to political 
philosophy.  If individual citizens are obligated to obey and support their government in 
exchange for protection, then why would they be permitted to violate this agreement?  Some 
prominent philosophers, including Allen Buchanan, David Miller, and Margaret Moore, have 
sought to answer this question, and we will explore their efforts in more detail shortly.  I will 
argue that their theories of secession are insufficient to determine when secession is morally just.  
To rectify this, I will propose a new understanding of secession that better accounts for the 
interests of both the group wishing to secede and the potential rump state.  Through a 
philosophical lens, I will answer the question: If and when is secession morally justifiable? 
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This paper will be divided into five sections.  Section one will define key terms through a 
founding myth.  Section two will describe three prominent theories of secession.  Section three 
will describe the primary issues with these three theories of secession.  Section four will lay out 
and support my proposed principle of secession.  Section five I will use modern examples of 
secession to illustrate the superiority of my proposed principle of secession.  Ultimately, I will 
argue for what I call The Secession Principle: Secession is justified if and only if the current 
government agrees to cede their claims to the territory that would secede. 
I.  A Founding Myth 
Before we talk about the breaking of states, we should consider their constitution, and 
specifically the meanings and distinctions between government, state, territory, and individual 
rights.  I will use a fictional story to explain these concepts.  While it is not historically accurate, 
the story will be a convenient way to illustrate the necessary terms and definitions. 
Imagine Diomedia, a remote island in the Pacific Ocean, where no outside civilization 
has ever been.  The island has sufficient resources to support a small population.  On Diomedia, 
there are two isolated groups of ten people, one on the east side of the island and one on the west.  
We can imagine the people in a Hobbesian state of nature, in complete freedom.  Both the west 
and east side of the island have moderately scarce resources, enough to live, but not so sufficient 
that the population has no conflicts.  Each individual on the island exercises their liberties, which 
express their freedom and autonomy.  Every person can interact with the objects on the island of 
Diomedia. They can use the water to survive, collect wood to build shelter, and hunt, gather, or 
cultivate food for sustenance.  Barring physical limitations, nothing is preventing any individual 
from interacting with their surroundings and exercising their liberty concerning these goods. 
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 As individuals pursue their lives, conflict inevitably occurs when two people choose to 
utilize the same resources, whether it be trying to eat the same animal, drink the last coconut, or 
farm the same land.  There are two options to resolve the conflict: coercion or agreement (or as 
Hobbes calls them, “covenants”).  Coercion occurs when a conflict becomes physical.  
Agreement is when the individuals resolve the conflict through recognized agreements.  It is 
important to note that in this analysis, the term “recognize” is not rooted in fairness. Instead, it 
relates to belief from both sides that an agreement is in force.  
Initially, the individuals on the West side of the island attempt to use coercion, fighting 
with their fists to capture and protect the goods they have gathered.  In a state of coercion, either 
a strong minority or a larger majority gains the lion's share of the goods.  Still, the constant 
conflict and unstable division of goods mean many in the society are harmed, and everyone, as 
Hobbes famously explained, lives in a state of risk and fear.1  Even the strongest do not benefit 
as they can be defeated by a group of weaker members.  Therefore, it is in everyone's interest to 
enter into agreements.  The individuals who come into conflict over the use of a resource 
negotiate a division of goods that is agreeable to each side.  Although the division of goods is not 
necessarily equal or fair, all members of society benefit more in a state of covenant rather than 
coercion.  Through agreements, property rights are established, as individuals define which 
resources and land a given individual can exercise their liberties over.  Property rights exist when 
individuals agree to recognize each other’s liberty over themselves and their defined resources 
and land.  
Now, we can also imagine that the people on the east side of the island are going through 
the same process.  Each side has established property rights through covenant, creating a series 
 
1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 
1994), pp. 106 - 110. 
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of agreements to recognize each other’s resources and land.  Still, over time, each member of the 
society realizes that the covenants are unstable, as there can always be a reversion to coercion by 
a member to get more land or resources.2  Therefore, the individuals on both sides of the island 
need a government to enforce and regulate property rights.   
The government regulates and defends covenants.  It formalizes property rights, acting as 
a third party to ensure that covenants are recognized by both parties and enforced.  Moreover, it 
can establish laws and regulations that create processes for defining property and developing 
other rights that society sees as imperative.  The government can also claim and secure the land, 
air, water, and other resources that are not currently unowned as public areas, available to all 
members of society.  The boundaries of the established property and public areas act as the limits 
of the area over which the government has authority.  Therefore, the government holds domain 
over the people, their property, and the public area it lays claim to.  
 Although the government maintains the right to govern a particular group of people, the 
limits to its power are ultimately a function of what the people who created the regime have 
recognized.  The effectiveness of government is rooted in the acquiescence of individuals; 
however, a legitimate and moral government requires the recognition of legitimacy and 
conformity to the laws by individuals under its rule.  Since the government is a function of the 
individuals who recognize and conform to it, then it must be subservient to their will and can be 
changed or removed if the people wish.3  Thus, while both sides of the island conclude they need 
a government, the form that this takes is entirely dependent on what the people recognize.   
 
2 It is important to note here that reversion to coercion is not inevitable.  There will be many covenants that can 
stand despite there being an incentive to revert to coercion.  Still, over time there is a high likelihood that some 
members will resort to gain a more favorable division of goods. 
3 There is an obvious reply to this argument, which is in many authoritarian governments, sovereignty might not rest 
with the people.  Instead, it might come from divine right or ideological justifications.  Still, power can be 
maintained only through force or conformity.  For example, in a monarchy maintained by divine right, the 
legitimacy of the monarch only holds if the broader populous follows the religion that provides that legitimacy.  If 
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On the west side of the island, the group of individuals decides to elect a leader for 1 year 
out of the 10 individuals.  Moreover, they confirm their right to enter into covenants and ensure 
that whoever enforces them must respect these rights.  In creating the government, the 
individuals sacrifice a level of their liberty, agreeing to unite behind the leader if there is a need 
to defend the people, and hand over the means required to exercise the government’s authority. 
On the east side of the island, the covenants continue to break down.  The strongest 
individuals continue to break their covenants, taking the lion's share of the resources.  Therefore, 
the weaker members of society realize they need protection from the stronger members, and 
determine there must be one strong leader to defend their covenants.  They choose the strongest 
member of society and endow them with absolute power for life in exchange for enforcing and 
arbitrating their covenants.  They agree to pay part of their resources to the strongest leader and 
fight as a group when it is necessary to defend the entire government from threats.  While these 
governments are different types, the point of this discussion is not what government is more 
legitimate, just to say there is a government that exercises authority over the nation. 
Now our mythic world reaches a level of stasis, for as long as the people recognize their 
governments as legitimate, there is stability.  If new claims to property arise, then the 
governments arbitrate and enforce the new covenant. Even if the people on the west or east side 
of Diomedia had to move to a different area of the island, as long as it is uninhabited, new 
covenants could be made and then enforced by the government of each side of the island.4  As 
the people of both societies move inland the west and the east side groups meet each other.  And 
 
the people refuse to recognize a government as legitimate and will not pay taxes or abide by laws, then it has to have 
sufficient force.  But, even the use of force requires recognition and conformity from the soldiers and nobles 
engaging in the use of force.  Therefore, the government operates as legitimate because people see it as legitimate, 
or they fear the force used.  Either way, it relies on the people’s state of mind as one of conformity and recognition.    
4 This adds an important distinction that the government is tied to the people under its rule, not necessarily to the 
land it encompasses. 
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at the point of their meeting lies a grove of orange trees.  Unsurprisingly, both groups have 
individuals interested in making covenants to claim rights over the grove.  This situation is 
analogous to the problem of resolving conflicts between individuals in a community, but in this 
case, it is a dispute between different governments.  
Similar to the conflict that originally gave rise to property rights, it is not clear which 
covenant is legitimate since both are exercising their liberties over the resources of Diomedia.  
Without legitimacy, individuals must call in their respective governments to defend their 
covenants.  This transfer of the main agent in the conflict changes the nature of the quarrel, from 
one of the individuals vying to exercise their liberty over resources and one between 
governments hoping to govern an area unencumbered. 
As with individuals, the governments of the east and west side have two courses for 
resolving this conflict: coercion or covenant.  The government may raise an army and use 
coercion to enforce their citizens' claims or even to conquer the other community.  While 
seeming like a straightforward solution, in reality, coercion creates a host of problems.  
Particularly, the fact that unless one government is destroyed or relinquishes its claim to the 
territory, a war can continue for years.  This creates a constant flux in these territories that 
constricts the people from utilizing the territory being fought over.  There can be no clear 
delineation of what covenants exist as they are constantly in intergovernmental conflict.   
Alternatively, covenants could be created between the governments.  The governments of 
the east and west could decide to merge into one unified government that would arbitrate the 
disputes over covenants.  Another solution is for the governments to divide the island's 
resources, land, air, and water into two pieces of territory.  One part would be under the authority 
of the government on the east side and the other side for the west side. 
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Recognizing the damage of conflict, let us imagine that the two sides of Diomedia see 
covenant as the most natural solution. The intergovernmental covenant is created between the 
east and west side on behalf of their respective groups, determining a set of boundaries defining 
which government regulates an area and its resources.  The area that the negotiations assign is 
not only regarding the contested grove but the island as a whole.  The agreement between the 
eastern and western governments is crafted partly on the strength and position of the 
governments.  Since the west side is more willing to fight a war, two-thirds of the island is given 
as the west's territory, and one-third is the east's area to govern.  Moreover, they decide to name 
the area governed by the west as the State of Westland and the eastern territory as the state of 
Eastland.     
Despite this covenant following coercion, it must be an agreement entered into by the 
legitimate governments who receive recognition of legitimacy from the populace. Once the 
agreement is established, all covenants within the territory are defended, arbitrated, and 
regulated, by the government within that boundary.  If an individual from the west side wanted to 
create a covenant in the east side’s territory, then they must abide by the rules and regulations of 
the east side’s government.   
The intergovernmental covenant creates two new institutions and concepts.  First, it 
creates the concept of territory.  Territory defines the domains of governments in which 
regulations, defense, and arbitration are permitted to a single sovereign entity.  Territory is not 
rooted in the people who live in it, but instead by the land, water, and air within the borders 
agreed to on the map.5  Territorial rights are the legitimate ability to govern a piece of territory.  
Before encountering another government, there was no reason for territorial boundaries to exist.  
 
5 Property can be possessed by an individual in multiple states.  When this occurs, the property is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the territory it is within. 
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There is simply no need to define what area of the island is controlled by a specific government 
because there is no potential conflicting claim to govern that territory.  That changes when the 
east and west sides meet and conflict arises.  Territory only becomes relevant when an 
intergovernmental-covenant is created to clarify the governance of current and future covenants. 
Second, the intergovernmental covenant creates the concept of the state.  The east and 
west governments need a system that further legitimizes their possession of territorial rights to 
reduce the likelihood of reversion to conflict.  They do this by creating the state.  The state is a 
territorially bounded vessel of legitimacy that is granted rights over a specific piece of territory.  
Territory in turn combines all the land allotted in the agreement, which includes the property of 
citizens, public land, as well as air, water, and other resources.  The legitimate government of the 
people living within the state has the right to exert the territorial rights endowed by the original 
covenant.  The state exists only when there are other governments or groups contesting 
possession and utilization of territory.  Therefore, the state exists only in the presence of other 
states.  The state acts as a durable institution because it is bound to territory instead of people.   
Even if successive governments are made up of a different population than those who originally 
made the borders, they must abide by the boundaries of the state unless the legitimate 
government agrees to a change in the boundary.  The result of the agreement between the east 
and west is that the island of Diomedia is now divided into two states with clearly defined 
borders aimed at preventing conflicts in the exercise of each state’s territorial rights. 
Now we can see that there are two different entities: the state and the government.  While 
the state is durable, rooted in the territory, and lines are drawn on a map, the government is 
flexible, finding its power in the people who live within the territory.  Distinguishing the two 
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concepts furthers our understanding of both the importance and severity of changing the 
institutions.  Changing a government is common; changing a state is not.  
 Ultimately, by telling this story, I aim is to broadly define or characterize and to 
distinguish some central concepts: property, government, state, and territory.  Of course, it gets 
more complicated, especially with territory.  Territory, in our story, is based on an agreement to 
divide jurisdiction over land, air, water, and resources of a specific area.  Territory is thus made 
up of all property and public lands, used by all or no one.  Thus, it is not confined to the citizens 
of a state who are using the property, but covers whatever the two states agree to provide 
jurisdiction over. 
To complete our fictional story, let us now consider the idea of secession.  To do this, we 
will focus on the state of Westland.  Over the next 100 years, the citizens of Westland live in 
peace.  Due to migration, immigration from Eastland, and economic specialization, however, the 
people of Westland have grown and changed into a diverse society, with cities, towns, and rural 
farmland and three distinct identity groups based on their cultures and their economic occupancy.  
The three cultures are the Tritons who live near the beach, the Agrarians who farm inland, and 
the Urbanites who are the tradespeople living in the city. Despite its history of peace and 
prosperity, groups in the state of Westland have become increasingly hostile.  They speak 
different languages and have different customs.  There is constant conflict for control over the 
government, each group seeking greater representation.  Moreover, the Agrarians make up the 
majority of the population, followed by the Urbanites, and then the Tritons.  Due to their large 
population, the Agrarians win these conflicts and dominate the government, making laws 
favorable to their culture and people.  A recent law made by the government of Westland 
outlawed the Tritons from holding a festival celebrating their culture and forced many people to 
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move from their homes to open more land for farming.  This was seen as an affront to the 
Tritons, who meet as a group to discuss ways to defend their culture and property.  They see the 
government as being deeply oppressive, morally objectionable, and interfering with their basic 
liberties to make their lives unhappy and intolerable. Initially, it was believed they could appeal 
to the Agrarians, but the government currently in power disregarded all of their attempts to 
protect Tritonian culture.  Following many debates, the Tritons realize that they have three 
options. 
One proposal is to attempt to overthrow the government in a revolution.  While it does 
not need to be violent, the Tritons could attempt to march on the government center, capture the 
elected leader, and institute a new government that is more equitable to them.  Many favor this 
option because it still maintains the current state and does not require the establishment of new 
power.  Moreover, this proposal’s supporters argue the Urbanites would support them, and if 
they overthrew the government in a revolution the Tritons could still freely interact and make 
covenants with the Urbanites and Agrarians 
Another option is pushing for autonomy, not seeking to establish a separate state but 
seeking an elected local government that can govern cultural practices and further protects 
property rights.  Although it would create a new government, similar to revolution, this solution 
would keep the state intact and merely change the form of the government.  Moreover, it would 
not require the new leader to have to receive recognition from the Agrarians, who would oppose 
a full-scale revolution.  
The final option is secession, wherein the Tritons would create a new localized 
government, but also a state with its territory.  If they secede, the Agrarians and Urbanites would 
have no ability to govern the territory of the Tritons, nor would they be able to tax or arbitrate 
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covenants in the new state.  Effectively, seceding would provide absolute autonomy to the 
Tritons, but also deprive many other citizens of Westland access to the current and future 
benefits of being in union with the Tritons and vice versa.  Moreover, would the State of 
Eastland recognize a Triton-controlled state as legitimate and respect its boundaries?  These 
questions weighed on the Tritons, as they must decide not only what is the best course of action, 
but also what is morally justified.  This question not only weighs on the Tritons but also those in 
the real world. 
II. Leading Philosophical Arguments Regarding Secession  
There are a variety of legal and philosophical approaches to the problem of justifying 
secession, but they can be boiled down to three basic categories:   First, Just Cause (Remedial 
Right), which limits just secession to a last resort remediation for violations of rights; second, 
Ascriptivist (Nationalist) which permits every nation a right to a state; and finally, Plebiscitary 
(Self-Determination), which supports majority rule in determining boundaries.6    
A. Buchanan 
Allen Buchanan sparked the contemporary philosophical discussion on secession with his 
book, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec, 
and other articles where he developed a comprehensive theory of secession.  Buchanan's theory, 
often referred to as Just-Cause or Remedial Right, argues that it is possible to defend a highly 
qualified unilateral right to secession, as a last resort for past injustices perpetrated on a specific 
group.  To summarize his argument, secession is justified when the violations of a group's human 
 
6 Allen Buchanan, ‘Secession’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2017 
(Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017). 
This article provides a broad overview of the three theories, which can provide other philosophers who advocate for 
this theory. 
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rights or protections are so significant that they outweigh the rights of the potential rump state to 
the possession of that territory. 
Buchanan began by arguing that having a moral right to secede implies both that it is 
acceptable for the possessor of the right to secede and that other states are obligated not to 
interfere.7  He determined that to fulfill these two conditions, the group wishing to secede from 
the existing state must have had its rights so thoroughly violated that the group’s interests 
outweigh the rump state’s interest in holding onto the territory populated by a group wishing to 
secede.  Buchanan claims that instead of a basic moral right to secession, secession is justified 
by an aggregation of potential injustices and legitimate interests, such as liberty, escaping 
discriminatory redistribution, self-defense, and rectifying past injustices.8  These different 
injustices are then taken on a case-by-case basis to determine the moral efficacy of a claim to 
secession.  The approach treats each potential interest or violation as having different weights.  
For example, if a government does not permit the celebration of a holiday in public, then this 
would not be significant enough to justify unilateral secession.  On the other hand, if genocide 
is performed against a group, then this would be a compelling and just claim to secession.  
Moreover, it is vital that the actions taken by the group be done as a last resort, wherein there is 
no possible alternative solution.  If another remedy exists, then Buchanan argues that should be 
taken instead.  
Buchanan also considers the rights of those opposed to secession.  These rights relate to 
the state and third parties, who have legitimate interests and rights to oppose secession.  These 
 
7 Allen E. Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 27. There is an aggregation of 12 different criteria for the moral right to 
secede—liberty, furthering diversity, the limited goals for the political association, making entry easier, escaping 
discriminatory redistribution, enhancing efficiency, self-determination, and nationalism, preserving cultures, self-
defense, rectifying past injustices, consent, and individual and group rights. 
8 Buchanan, Secession, pp. 30 – 81, 
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rights include but are not limited to, self-defense, protecting majority rule, the threat of anarchy, 
and preventing wrongful taking.9  If fulfilled, these considerations would oppose the moral right 
to secession and support the maintenance of the current state of affairs.  They lean heavily on 
the interests of defending the state, especially the portions that do not wish to secede.  In doing 
so, it operates similar to a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the importance of the rights and 
interests of the would-be rump state and the group wishing to secede. 
Another way to approach Buchanan's theory is from the part of Just War Theory that 
describes Jus ad Bellum.  There must be a just cause for which unilateral secession is justified.  
Also, it must be proportional to the cause, so an insignificant slight cannot justify unilateral 
secession.  Moreover, it must have a legitimate authority to exercise it.  In Buchanan's case, this 
is done through the collective action of a defined group.10  Next, it must have a chance of 
success.  Just as in war, the seceded state must be able to operate independently of the rump 
state to justify secession.  Finally, secession must be the last resort, the only way to rectify the 
injustice occurring to the particular group. 
When considering these two competing criteria, Buchanan requires a clear 
comprehension of the facts of the case.  For example, when the thirteen North American 
colonies wanted to secede from British rule, the colonists had legitimate interests in rectifying 
past abuses by British soldiers and taxation without representation.  On the other hand, the 
United Kingdom had a legitimate claim to the lands that they had colonized.  First, Buchanan 
would need to weigh not only the violations or potential violations of rights but also the 
 
9 Buchanan, Secession, pp. 30 - 81. 
Buchanan discussed the following rights—protecting legitimate expectations, self-defense, protecting majority rule, 
minimization of strategic bargaining, soft paternalism, the threat of anarchy, preventing wrongful taking, and 
distributive justice. 
10 Groups in Buchanan's eyes can recognize politically or not by the current government.  He uses the example of 
Lithuania in the former U.S.S.R. as an example of a politically recognized group and the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq 
as one who are not.    
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legitimate interests of the current government and alternative solutions to secession.  Second, 
Buchanan determines whether the colonies have any other recourse to solve their oppression.  
For example, do they have representation, or is there a place for negotiation? Finally, Buchanan 
would determine if in this specific case, are the thirteen colonies capable of taking actions to 
rectify the injustice that does not require secession.  In doing so, Buchanan establishes a high 
bar for secession to be justified.  Ultimately, he argues that secession is justified when the 
violations of a group’s human rights, interests, or protections are so significant that they 
outweigh the rights of the potential rump state to the possession of that territory. 
B. Miller 
Another philosopher, David Miller, argues for an Ascriptivist (nationalist) theory of 
secession.  Miller’s basic principle says secession is justified when a national group with proper 
rights to a territory chooses to secede.  In his writings, Miller ascribes territorial rights to the 
nation through the Principle of Nationality.11  The principle of nationality states that national 
identities are a legitimate way of perceiving personal identity and that people have unique duties 
to others who share the same identity.  Nations, therefore, have a strong claim to political self-
determination.12 He defines the nation as a group of people who have obligations to each other, 
recognize they are in the same group, and seek personal autonomy often through having a shared 
cultural, historical identity, and connection to a geographic area.13 Moreover, Miller argues that 
this concept of the nation can be employed to explain when secession is just or unjust. The 
principle of nationality implies that nations should be allowed to express their self-determination 
if they wish, provided their actions are not detrimental or unjust.  More specifically, secession is 
 
11 David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1. 
12 Miller, On Nationality, pp. 1. 
13 David Miller, ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality’, in National Self-Determination and Secession, ed. 
Margaret Moore (Oxford University Press, 1998), 65. 
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justified by a nation seeking better governance if they have a separate identity from the broader 
populace and can verify historically their claims to the territory they wish to take.14  For 
example, if we return to Diomedia, Miller would argue the Tritonians, as a distinct nation, have 
the right to enact laws and determine their government in the area of Westland they occupy, as 
long as they do not oppress any non-Tritonians in their land.  
Miller argues that to apply the principle of Nationality, two constraining criteria are 
necessary.  First, the group wishing the secede must have a distinct national identity, wherein 
individuals do not see themselves as part of both the nation wishing to secede and the broader 
nation.15  This first criterion ensures that a group cannot simply claim secession based on 
nationality when they are not uniquely independent of the broader nation in the state.  The state 
and nation differ as the state acts as an empty institution that invokes legitimacy upon a 
government.  It is empty and can be occupied by any group or collection of individuals who live 
on in a territory.  On the other hand, the nation goes beyond politics: it is a historical and cultural 
connection between individuals.  They perceive themselves as a group and have ties to the land 
they occupy as a collective.  Second, the nation wishing to secede must have a proper claim to 
the land they wish to take, meaning they must have a historical tie to the land.16  By adding this 
criterion, Miller ensures that groups not only have to perceive themselves as a nation but also 
have a legitimate claim to occupy the territory they wish to take.  Thus, a migrant group could 
not move into a benign state and then immediately secede, claiming national self-determination.  
These two qualifications ensure claims to secession are limited to legitimate nations with claims 
to the land they wish to make into their new state. 
 
14 Miller, ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality,’ pp. 69.  
15 Miller, ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality,’ pp. 69. 
16 Miller, ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality,’ pp. 69. 
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Furthermore, if a nation fulfills these two criteria, Miller further qualifies his support for 
secession by accounting for political realities, such as the interests of potential members of the 
rump state who live in the seceding state.  Here he calls for a case-by-case analysis that might 
include reconciliation or population exchanges to avoid violence or persecution.17  Moreover, he 
claims the importance of ensuring secession will not collapse the rump state.  Similar to 
Buchanan, Miller insists on careful approaches to secession that avoid violence and instability. 
Miller's Ascriptivist theory differs from Buchanan's in a few ways.  First, it recognizes 
self-determination as a legitimate reason for secession.  If a distinct nation collectively 
determines they wish to secede, then that justifies the secession.  Buchanan, on the other hand, 
sees secession only as a last resort justified by a government's unjust actions.  This in turn makes 
Miller's argument more lenient to secession.  While he sets high standards for being considered a 
nation, injustice doesn't need to be performed against the group to warrant secession. Second, 
Miller defines a group in specific terms as a nation.  Unlike Buchanan, Miller perceives the 
legitimate unit of self-determination as a distinct nation, meaning that the group that can exercise 
the right to secede must be a distinct nation as described above.  Buchanan is more lenient, not 
clearly defining a group outside of common political interest. 
Still, the two writers have some similarities.  Miller does not permit secession that intends 
to or results in the oppression of a minority group.  Similar to Buchanan, Miller does emphasize 
justice as the goal of states, and secession that might result in serious oppression or violence 
against another group cannot be justified.  Furthermore, Miller and Buchanan both emphasize the 
risk of subjectivity when analyzing claims to secession.  They approach their analysis on a case-
by-case basis, determining the weight and extent to which a group or nation fits the criteria for 
 
17 Miller, ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality,’ pp. 72 - 75. 
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secession.  The two philosophers avoid absolute principles, attempting to qualify their 
approaches to avoid too lenient a standard for secession. 
C. Moore 
Finally, the philosopher Margaret Moore defends a different, Plebiscitary (self-
determination) theory of secession.  Moore’s principle states that secession is justified as an act 
of self-determination by a united group with territorial rights.  In her recent book, A Political 
Theory of Territory, Moore outlines a theory of territorial justice and an implicit theory of 
secession.18  Moore begins her argument by defining two types of rights: residency and 
occupancy.  Residency rights are the rights of individuals to live on a piece of land that they 
intend to use to achieve their life projects.  Occupancy rights are the rights held by a group of 
individuals holding residency rights to live on a piece of land as a community.19  Similar to 
residency rights, the group must intend to use the land to survive and achieve its goals.  
Specifically, the group and individuals must use the land for their entire lives, making expulsion 
from that land detrimental to their existence.  From occupancy rights, a group, or as Moore 
termed, "people," can achieve territorial rights that are exercised through the creation of the state.    
The key to the creation of a "people" is consent from the individuals who maintain residency 
rights.20  They must agree to join the political unit of the "people" and cannot be coerced into 
participation.  While in this group, they maintain the right to self-determination, capable of 
consenting to the government and group in which they belong.  Thus, the state and the exercise 
of territorial rights is a function of mutual advantage in allowing individuals to further their 
survival on their lands rather than a cultural union.  The group can seek a society that provides 
 
18 Margaret Moore, A Political Theory of Territory (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 128 - 129. 
19 Margaret Moore, ‘Territorial Rights and Territorial Justice’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2020 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2020). 
20 Moore, ‘Territorial Rights and Territorial Justice’ 
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the benefits, whether it is union with other "people" or through independence.  Their 
government, which holds jurisdiction over the land the community occupies, comes from what 
the collective consents to.  
Moore’s theory of secession derives from her theory of territory.  Moore argues that 
secession is a tricky question because, on one hand, she advocates for self-determination, but on 
the other hand, secession could be detrimental to the rump state and the other individuals who 
rely on it.21  Still, she wishes to respect a “people’s” right to self-determination.  They should be 
permitted to determine which state or government governs their territory.  To solve this dilemma, 
Moore introduces a principle of reciprocity to govern the process and outcome of a justified 
secession.  
As described above, much of Moore's conception of the "people" is based on interactions 
between individuals that lead to the development of a society and institutions.  Through this 
development, the concept of reciprocity arises.  Moore defines reciprocity as an engagement 
between two groups to interact for mutual benefit.22  For example, if you have a farmer and a 
sculptor, and the farmer gives the sculptor food and the sculptor gives the farmer art of similar 
value, then reciprocity is established.  As the interactions occur repeatedly, and the individuals 
begin to rely on each other for their reciprocal actions, institutionalized reciprocity is established.  
Institutionalized reciprocity should be respected as an ongoing mutually beneficial obligation.   
Moore extends institutionalized reciprocity to the interactions of different regions and 
“people.”  In a state, people living in different regions trade and interact to mutually benefit one 
another.  If one mines iron ore, and the other smelts it into steel, then the regions are intertwined 
in institutionalized reciprocity.  They have a series of obligations to each other created through 
 
21 Moore, A Political Theory of Territory, pp. 128 - 129. 
22 Moore, A Political Theory of Territory, pp. 130 - 134. 
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past interactions.  But, if the region that mines the iron wishes to secede through, claiming a right 
to self-determination, a conflict is created.  In Moore’s conception of Territorial Justice, it would 
be unjust to break these reciprocal ties without cause.  Still, the “people” have a right to self-
determination.23  Moore’s solution is for the previous ties of reciprocity to be maintained.  If the 
iron mining region wishes to secede for reasons other than injustice, then they are required to 
maintain these mutually beneficial relationships with the rump state.   
Thus, the principle of reciprocity acts as a roadmap for a just secession.  If a state is 
persecuting another group within its territory, then that group is not in a reciprocal relationship.  
If they decide to secede, then there is no obligation to maintain ties, and are thus allowed to 
leave.24  The injustice committed that justifies breaking these obligations must be significant.  
Similar to Buchanan, it would need to be something along the lines of genocide or constant 
oppression.  It cannot merely be a small slight.   
On the other hand, if a group wishes to secede from a just state, then they are required to 
maintain their mutually beneficial ties with the rump state to prevent unjustly harming the people 
who do not secede.   While it can be difficult to maintain the same economic or security ties, a 
seceded country in Moore's eyes should get as close as possible.  For example, the iron mining 
region would need to continue to send its ore to the smelters under the same contracts as before 
the secession.  Still, if the contracts were not feasible unless there was no border crossing, then 
Moore would permit the mining country to modify the contracts but still must ensure they are 
fulfilled.  If they did not, then the people in the rump state would lose their livelihood and make 
it harder for the state to function.  Even if there are modifications, Moore believes the principle 
of reciprocity should be maintained as well as possible. 
 
23 Moore, A Political Theory of Territory, pp. 130 - 134. 
24 Moore, A Political Theory of Territory, pp. 130 - 134. 
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 Miller and Moore's theories are both similar and different.  Moore and Miller differ on the 
issue of to whom they ascribe the right to self-determination.  Moore believes the morally 
relevant group is defined by its political unity and common interest.  Miller ascribes it to a 
culturally united group with historical ties to the land and a distinct common identity.  For him, 
the nation is more than just a common political identity, it is a shared culturally and historically 
meaningful identity. The difference in their definitions means Moore has a lower threshold for a 
collective to be defined as a group.   
 While Miller and Moore differ in this respect, both believe secession can be justified by 
appealing to a principle of self-determination.  If the majority of a group wishes to remake 
borders and create their government, then this can justify secession.  Moreover, the historical ties 
of groups to the land are relevant in both theories.  Moore posits a group must hold occupancy 
rights before holding territorial rights, which include the right to self-determination.  Moreover, 
to be a nation ascribed the right to secede, they must prove historical and cultural ties to an area.  
A nation cannot merely take any physical space, it must as a collective have a tie to it.  
These similarities stand in stark contrast to Buchanan, who believes only injustice can be 
the cause for secession, and only if the harm of injustice outweighs the harm that happens to the 
rump state.  Still, all three philosophers are similar in that they give some account of the interests 
of the rump state.  Buchanan limits the justification of secession by making the threshold for 
secession particularly high, Miller, by limiting the definition of a nation, and Moore through the 
principle of reciprocity.  While they approach the issues differently, each theory recognizes that 
secession is a strong measure with long-ranging effects.  Therefore, each theory takes great care 
to put caveats on the justification of secession and to avoid advocating excessive secession. 
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III. Analysis of Buchanan, Miller, and Moore: What’s Missing? 
Now, I will illustrate the shortcomings of each of the previous three theories.  These 
theories are not exhaustive, but they represent past moral arguments for justifying secession.  
While each philosopher appeals to important moral and political values, three key topics are not 
fully accounted for: the distinction between states and governments, the difference between 
revolution and secession, and the harm caused by secession to the individuals in the rump state. 
First, none of the theories we examined adequately account for the difference between the 
government and the state.  As illustrated in the founding myth, legitimate government derives 
from a contract in society among its citizens to regulate and defend their covenants and their 
basic rights.  This differs from the state, which derives from covenants between different 
governments.  When two adjoining governments agree to define a border between them, they 
create the state as an institution that possesses territorial rights to the land.  The state is a durable 
institution of legitimacy.  That government then uses the authority derived from the state to enact 
laws, enforce borders, and so on.  The people living there have a right to create a government, 
but they do not have the right to directly create a state.  Therefore, a successful theory of 
secession should recognize this difference.  Unfortunately, the three theories discussed above fail 
adequately to do this. 
Both Moore and Miller fall victim to the false assumption that territorial rights are 
functions of self-determination.  Moore’s connection of territorial rights to the development of a 
politically unified group falsely ascribes territorial rights to the groups living in the area.25  Since 
territorial rights and the boundaries of a state are created from the need to define borders with 
opposing groups, they are created through the acts of the government.  The government 
 
25 Margaret Moore, A Political Theory of Territory, pp. 128 - 129. 
 23 
negotiates the boundaries and establishes the state. The people cannot change what they did not 
create; only the entity that creates a boundary has the moral authority to change it.  Therefore, 
only the government inhabiting the state's power can cede control over the territory.  
Similarly, Miller argues that self-determination and territorial rights are possessed by the 
nation that legitimately occupies and is historically connected to a piece of land.  Miller makes a 
compelling argument for a nation to live in an area that it has deep ties to.  Still, this continues to 
treat the state and territorial rights as something more than an efficient division of jurisdictional 
authority.26  Nations can, through their right to self-determination, seek to change their 
government, but not their borders.   
Still, any nation or group could theoretically peacefully advocate for the secession of a 
specific piece of territory, but it cannot unilaterally secede.  It must have the recognition from the 
government of the would-be rump state.  Without recognition, there is a significant risk of 
members of the state having their land arbitrarily expropriated without having a say.     
Buchanan does a better job at hinting at the difference between the government and state.  
As I explain later, he recognizes that there is a difference between overthrowing an unjust 
government and seceding from a state.27  Still, he does not develop a clear principle to determine 
the difference between just action against the government and just secession.  Therefore, while 
Buchanan does provide a good start, his theory does not go far enough in explicitly 
differentiating the government and the state. 
Second, the justifications referred to by Buchanan, Miller, and Moore for secession are 
mostly justifications for revolution.  As I described in the initial myth, there is a key difference 
between revolution and secession.  Revolution, which is the overthrow of an existing 
 
26 David Miller, ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality’, pp. 65. 
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government, would be justified under similar circumstances to Buchanan’s Just Cause theory of 
secession.  If the government perpetrates serious injustices against the people, and if these 
injustices cannot be rectified in any other way, then those people are justified in overthrowing 
that government.  From this, the question naturally arises: When should a mistreated group 
choose revolution or secession?  In response, Buchanan argues that secession is a more extreme 
action than revolution since secession punishes both the existing government and the people as a 
collective.28  Secession removes the territory belonging to the collective people. By removing 
this territory, secession denies the other citizens in the state access to the resources, free 
movement, and other privileges.29  Revolution, on the other hand, is an act that can benefit the 
entire population by freeing them from an unjust government.  It does not punish the members of 
the state who do not participate in the government; instead, it is supposedly freeing them from 
tyranny.  By clarifying that secession is a more extreme action, Buchanan sets a higher bar for 
secession than the justification for revolution.  
To illustrate this distinction, compare the French Revolution and the American 
Revolution.  The French Revolution was a revolt against the government of Louis XVI and the 
broader social order it represented.  The Third Estate felt it was being abused by an unfair 
system, and it attempted to change that situation through revolution.  While much bloodshed 
and upheaval occurred, the French Revolution did not seek to take land from France, nor 
disinherit future generations from utilizing the wealth of the State.  Instead, it changed the 
government of the country but not the fundamental boundaries of the state. 
The American Revolution, however, was an act of secession, as the thirteen colonies 
sought total independence from the British state and the creation of a new state on its territory.  
 
28 Buchanan, Secession, pp. 152 – 162. 
29 Buchanan, Secession, pp. 30 - 81. 
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The colonists did not seek to overthrow the British parliament but sought instead to leave them 
completely behind.  In creating a new state, the current and future British people lost their 
claims to exploit the wealth and resources of the United States.  The two historical events reveal 
that Secession is a far more consequential change in terms of what resources and territory are 
controlled by the state, and therefore should reach a higher bar to justify its occurrence. 
Still, Buchanan does not provide a clear enough mechanism for determining whether a 
cause justifies revolution, secession, or both.  In his conclusion, Buchanan argues: 
Among the types of state-perpetrated injustices that can justify secession are not only the violations of basic 
individual civil and political rights that orthodox liberal political philosophy recognizes as legitimate grounds for 
revolution but also the injustice of discriminatory redistribution, the state’s exploitation of one group to benefit 
others.30 
 
The argument made above expands the potential sufficient conditions of secession to cover both 
of those violations of a group's rights.  Therefore, it is unclear where to draw the line in which a 
group can secede or individuals being oppressed are justified in a revolution.  Buchanan claims 
it should be made on a case-by-case basis, but I find this response unconvincing because 
individuals can perceive oppression differently.  A group like the American colonists might 
perceive British taxation without representation as a truly horrendous act justifying secession, 
but the British, or a 3rd party like the Spanish, may see it as a less serious offense.  Buchanan 
fails to rectify these potential differences in opinion, and when applying his theory, one cannot 
fully determine whether it is justifying secession or revolution. 
Since Miller and Moore fail to distinguish between the government and the state, their 
arguments do not distinguish justifications for revolution from justifications for secession.  A 
group of people, if they have been unjustly treated or feel they need autonomy, can rebel or 
force a revolution to change the government or seek autonomy.  The right to self-determination 
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permits this but does not necessarily justify secession.  An unjust government does not 
necessarily justify the extreme act of secession.   It is imperative to distinguish secession as a 
morally just solution to cases when serious injustice has occurred.  And in doing this, It is also 
important to consider not only the interests of the existing government in cases of secession but 
also the interests of other citizens in the state.  There may be cases where revolution is justified 
but secession is not. 
Third, Buchanan, Miller, and Moore’s theories do not fully account for the irreparable 
harm secession causes.  As I have explained, secession expropriates potential benefits from the 
members of the rump state.  Not only will the current citizens of the rump state be deprived of 
taxation and assistance in defense, but future generations.  While agreements can be made to 
mitigate these harms, secession still damages the current and future individuals of the rump state.  
Thus, a theory of secession needs to fully account for this harm.  Each of the theories we are 
considering address this issue, but their analyses come up short.  
For example, Buchanan argues that Lithuania was justified in secession because of its 
conquest by the Soviet Union and the need for rectificatory justice.31  Buchanan does try to 
account for the damages to non-Lithuanians by offering dual citizenship and emigration to 
Russians.  Still, he fails to realize that every person can be harmed by secession and deserves 
consideration in a decision to change the borders.  Specifically, Buchanan argues that neither 
Soviet colonists in Lithuania nor their descendants should be considered when determining 
whether to secede.  Even if non-Lithuanian colonists settled by unjust means, they and their 
descendants still have a right to determine their government.32  If they are concerned about a 
declaration of secession, then they should be involved in that decision.  The benefits of living in 
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the same territory and the harm that occurs when it is taken away impact the whole polity.  
Therefore, the interests of the whole state should be taken into account.  Exclusion of anyone 
living in the territory from a process of secession prevents a full accounting of the interests of 
those against it. 
Moore proposes an interesting way to get around this, by emphasizing reciprocity.  She 
believes that a group that exerts its right to self-determination through secession should uphold 
economic ties and covenants with the rump state unless serious injustice is done to the group 
wishing to secede.  Specifically, Moore argues that reciprocity mitigates significant harm to the 
rump state while not violating a group's right to self-determination. Still, I take issue with this 
principle.  If a state completely secedes, it will have territorial rights and sovereignty over its 
decisions.  Thus, they should not be bound to the retention of past agreements in perpetuity.  
Moore's conception of reciprocity would not permit a seceded state to truly have autonomy over 
its territory.33  Moore's argument for reciprocity applies better to groups using self-determination 
to achieve semi-autonomy rather than completely separating their territory.  Therefore, Moore's 
appeal to reciprocity does not in the end help to justify secession.  There must be a higher bar to 
morally justify such drastic action.  
Miller attempts to solve the issue of irreparable harm in two ways.  First, he places a high 
bar to pass for a group of people to be considered a nation with the right to self-determination.  
Particularly, Miller requires that the group have a distinct national identity, meaning the people 
in a self-determining nation do not identify with two different groups.34  For example, if the 
people of North Carolina see themselves as both North Carolinians and Americans, then they do 
not have a right to secede.  Moreover, to justify secession, the nation needs a clear, historically 
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backed claim to the area they wish to take.  Second Miller further qualifies his argument by 
claiming that the political realities of the rump state, particularly the stability of the rump state, 
affect the justifiability of secession.    
Although Miller attempts to account for the effects on the rump state, he fails to clarify 
why self-determination should outweigh the harm to the rest of the state.  If the nation initially 
created a state on consensual grounds, and the people of the rump state have developed important 
economic and defensive ties, then they should not lose that territory without agreeing to terms of 
secession.  Even if losing these ties would not destroy the rump state, it does not mean they can 
be removed without some recognition of the rump state.  Similar to our objection to Moore, 
Miller fails to distinguish between the right to reside in an area, and the right to control its 
territory.  These territorial rights, as a function of unity, cannot and should not be expropriated 
by an appeal to self-determination without the current possessor’s recognition. Miller thus does 
not fully account for the irreparable harm of secession. 
Buchanan does a better job of accounting for the harm of secession.   His method of 
aggregation and weighing of interests does consider the damage of secession and ensuring both 
sides have their interests represented.  Still, Buchanan permits unilateral secession in the case of 
serious injustice, such as severe persecution.  While it appears that the government’s unjust 
actions would forfeit their claim to the territory, in reality, it is unfair to the current and future 
generations that are not part of the oppression.35  Those in the state who are not part of the 
government, especially in authoritarian regimes, should not be unilaterally punished for a 
government they have not chosen and may even oppose.  Therefore, Buchanan's permission of 
unilateral secession, although setting a high bar, still permits unjust secession.  
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Since the harm of secession is so significant, the bar for secession must require both 
sides' interests to be represented.  Therefore, for both sides to represent their interests, secession 
cannot be unilaterally justified.  Instead, it must be a function of a covenant and recognition 
between both parties.  For example, let's have two groups within a single state, Group A and 
Group B.  Group A decides to secede, but the government chooses to not recognize the 
secession.  Still, Group A finds a way to prevent the government of Group B from enacting laws, 
but the rump state government does not recognize the secession.  In the area Group A occupies, 
it acts as a de facto government, but not a state with territorial rights.  But, over time, as the 
government of the rump state agrees to recognize that territory as legitimate, it cedes the right to 
it.  At this point, once the rump state’s government cedes its territorial claim, the area Group A 
occupies becomes a state. 
Buchanan, Miller, and Moore all permit unilateral secession, whether it be through self-
determination in the case of Miller and Moore, or remedial right claims in Buchanan.  These 
mechanisms will inevitably prevent both the would-be secessionists and the rump state from 
having a voice in the change in borders.   From this analysis, we should conclude that Buchanan, 
Miller, and Moore’s theories fall short in fully accounting for vital concepts that relate to 
secession.  To rectify these issues, I will defend a new principle of secession.  
IV. The Secession Principle 
Buchanan, Moore, and Miller ultimately fail to account for the differences between states 
and governments and between revolution and secession.  As a consequence, their respective 
theories fail to take proper account of the harm caused by secession to the individuals in the 
rump state and the vitality of recognition in the creation of new states.  Instead, I propose a new 
principle of secession:  
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The Secession Principle: Secession is justified if and only if the current state that 
possesses the territorial rights of an area relinquishes its claim to the territory and 
recognizes the new state. 
To illustrate how this principle would operate, let us return to our original example of the 
desire for secession in the State of Westland.  At the time we left the story, the state of Westland 
is made up of three groups, the Agrarians who dominate political life, the Urbanites, and the 
Tritons.  The Tritons, because of past oppression believe the only way to properly defend their 
group is to leave the state of Westland and create a new state.  Still, their new state needs land 
and since all of the land on Diomedia is the territory of either Westland or Eastland, they decide 
they have no alternative but to take the land they live on as their territory.   Still, the Urbanites 
and Agrarians are opposed to this secession, and since the Tritons do not have enough political 
power to get the government to permit secession, they begin protesting and asking Eastland for 
help.  Although Eastland may be sympathetic to Triton's cause, they are forced to remember the 
covenant they made with Westland establishing the borders and territory of each state.  
Therefore, until Westland agrees to sacrifice this land, Eastland cannot justifiably recognize the 
Tritons as an independent nation.36 
The only way that Eastland can justifiably provide military support or intervene in 
support of the Tritonian movement for secession is if the Government of Westland actively 
oppresses Tritonian life.  Here, Buchanan’s Just Cause theory becomes relevant.  If the 
Tritonians are under so much oppression that their existence or way of life is under threat, then 
they can be justified in using violence to resist.  This in turn justifies intervention from other 
states like Eastland based on the morally acceptable aim of preventing injustice.  However, 
 
36 If the government got so repressive, then Eastland could justifiably provide proxy support, but they would need a 
just cause, such as explicit repression.  Also, this intervention would likely justify war between Eastland and 
Westland.   
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assistance by Eastland is limited to defending the Tritonians from oppression.  Eastland can act 
as a peacekeeper, to prevent invasion or active repression, but cannot seek to forcefully tear apart 
the state of Westland.  Still, if the Tritonians are not under significant pressure that might justify 
violence, then Eastland cannot interfere with the actions that occur within the sovereign territory 
of Westland.  Similar to direct invasion, a state cannot without just cause seek to interfere with 
the boundaries or actions of another sovereign state as that would violate the original covenant 
during the creation of the borders. Since secession requires recognition of a new state by the 
rump state, the Tritonians are justified in seeking secession but outside support and the use of 
violence requires significant oppression similar to Buchanan’s just cause. 
As the movement from the Tritons intensifies, some Triton leaders consider the 
possibility of violent rebellion.  Many want to use acts of terror to fight for their cause.  Although 
this might be effective, one Tritonian leader reminds the others that while their culture has been 
repressed, violence cannot be justified unless it is proportional, for it would be unjust to kill 
those who have not killed or oppressed the Tritonians.37  Although this argument lasts for now, 
soon the Agrarian and Urbanites order a crackdown on demonstrations, including arrests and 
deaths of Tritonians.  This repression ultimately leads the Tritonians to realize they have a just 
cause for retaliation, including violence, and that it is their last option.  So, they decide to raise 
an army and fight Westland for their freedom. 
As the war goes on, the Tritonian military leaders are shown to be quite competent.  As 
they continue to gain victory, the rest of Westland relents and decides to seek peace.  At a peace 
conference, the state of Westland and the leaders of the Tritons agree that a new state, Tritonia 
 
37 Here I am referencing Jus Ad Bellum, for a group to morally use violence, they must have a just cause, legitimate 
authority, proportionality, last resort.  We assume legitimate authority is held by groups of individuals seeking to 
defend themselves from violent repression.  
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will be created.  It will be made up of the land that the Tritons occupy and some inland territory 
to provide them better farmlands.  Once the treaty is signed, and Westland recognizes the 
borders, the territorial rights are granted to the state of Tritonia and thus secession is now done.  
When discussing the importance of accounting for the damage to future generations, it is 
important to remember that we cannot consider every single person’s opinion.  The future 
generations have not been born yet and have a right to be protected.  Since the future generations 
cannot be consulted, the best way to account for their potential objections is to have a 
collaborative rather than unilateral effort.  While this collaborative effort will not fully express 
the unknown benefits or costs of ceding land, it does ensure that decisions are not made rashly or 
with only one side's interests in mind.  Remember, when we discussed the original creation of 
Eastland and Westland, they created the two states to avoid conflict with one another over what 
territory their government could administer.  Both sides considered their interests, and while they 
did not have input from future generations, they still provided the best account possible for what 
situation would be best for their community.  The state can be created as a permanent entity 
because there are longstanding agreements that were originally made with the express interests 
of both sides in mind, and thus a change in the borders and creation of a new state must follow 
the same mechanism. 
This example is meant to illustrate that The Secession Principle operates in a simple and 
broadly applicable way.  It does not require massive historical analyses of national identity, 
demographics, or accounts of injustice.  It merely requires that there be a multisided agreement 
to relinquish control over a piece of territory and transfer the territorial rights to a different state.  
The following discussion will highlight how The Secession Principle accounts for the flaws that 
plague Buchanan, Miller, and Moore. 
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A key advantage of my account is that, unlike Moore or Miller, the principle does not 
rely on the proper identification of a group possessing occupancy rights to a piece of land.  Any 
politically united group can be justified in seeking secession, but they cannot claim to maintain 
territorial rights and have a state until the current possessor recognizes this and chooses to 
relinquish any future claims to the land.  In doing so, it recognizes the durability of territory and 
states.  In a way, this principle allows for many groups to properly seek secession but limits their 
ability to succeed until the rest of the state agrees to the change in borders. 
This in turn solves the issue of self-determination.  As discussed earlier, Moore and 
Miller place a close connection between a group's right to self-determination and territorial 
rights.  While they try to qualify their arguments by stating it must be determined on a case by 
case basis, their arguments favor the group wishing to secede without accounting for the harm 
inflicted on the individuals in the rump state.  My theory avoids this imbalance by separating 
territorial rights from direct self-determination and making the creation of territory a function of 
covenant rather than just occupancy.  Thus, The Secession Principle permits individuals on both 
sides to exert their self-determination through negotiation and avoids improper expropriation 
from unilateral secession.  
Furthermore, The Secession Principle places the ability to change the borders of a state 
within the hands of the legitimate government.  A state should only lose territory if it agrees to 
cede its rights to that land and recognize the new government as legitimate.  It ensures territory is 
never expropriated from the other members of society, instead of leaving it to be from an 
agreement.  For example, during the American Revolution, the thirteen colonies declared their 
independence in 1776.  If the perspective was taken from Moore or Miller, this Declaration of 
Independence could have been enough to endow the colonies as a formal state.  But, how is it 
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fair for other subjects of the British empire to lose territory without having some say in its loss?  
In effect, the benefits they would have gained from free trade and unified protection for a subject 
in Canada or Scotland would be lost.  Therefore, the United States did not officially secede or 
become a state until the British agreed to the Treaty of Paris in 1783 formally ending the War. 
Moreover, my principle permits a group who perceives any type of retribution to seek 
remedial justice, but still limits these actions to non-separation until the current state agrees.  As 
discussed above, while attempting to account for the difference between secession and 
revolution, Buchanan fails to effectively define when one is justified over the other.  My 
principle clarifies this, by stating that both Secession and revolution can be justified by the 
causes claimed by Buchanan, but in secession, the result requires a covenant between the new 
and rump state.  In doing so, it clarifies that secession has a higher hurdle to get through, but not 
by trying to balance the aggregation of different offenses but based on what is an agreed-upon 
outcome.  Thus, it permits both sides to have a say in the creation of new states without giving 
one side complete control.  The group seeking secession can advocate and respond 
proportionally to the acts of the state, but the state also must be involved in the changing of 
borders and granting of territorial rights.  
Therefore, The Secession Principle does permit war for secession, conditional on it 
fulfilling the conditions of jus ad bellum.  If secession comes as a result of war, it remains 
legitimate.  While one may see coerced recognition as illegitimate, in truth it is merely the 
creation of an agreement that ends the conflict.  When a peace treaty is made between multiple 
parties to create peace, both sides are basing their concessions on their relative position.  Their 
position is in part a result of the coercion that occurs in war, but just because this coercion exists 
does not mean the act of recognition is no longer legitimate.  Thus, the resulting secessions can 
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come about as an end to the conflict, and undoing secession cannot constitute a just cause for 
war. 
Finally, a practical advantage to The Secession Principle is that it clarifies claims over 
disputed territory.  While this is an argument about secession, this principle can also apply more 
broadly to border disputes.  Since a state loses its territory only when it agrees to sacrifice it, this 
principle prevents a state who loses territory from returning to claim its sovereignty.  For 
example, if the future leaders of Westland wanted some of the inland territories back, they would 
not have a just claim to do so because their legitimate government has already sacrificed this 
land.  And without having a just cause for war, then these borders are at least morally stable.  
Thus, this principle does not require a full analysis of the groups who lived in the territory, but 
merely gives the territory to the government which was granted it through covenant.  Thus, 
claims to territory may be more easily arbitrated and resolved to avoid future conflict and 
confusion. Ultimately, The Secession Principle is a better account for justifying when secession 
is just versus unjust.   
V. Cases Studies 
In this section, I will illustrate The Secession Principle by applying it to two modern case 
studies to determine if secession is justified. Through this application, I will illustrate how it 
performs better than Buchanan, Miller, and Moore’s theories.   
A. South Sudan 
South Sudan officially seceded from Sudan in 2011, becoming the world’s newest 
country.38  South Sudan was quickly recognized around the world, implying that the secession 
 
38 “Sudan Profile - Timeline,” BBC News, September 10, 2019, sec. Africa. 
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was accepted.  We will now apply The Secession Principle to determine whether South Sudanese 
secession was morally justified. 
 Sudan and South Sudan are two large countries in North-Eastern Africa.  Sudan has a 
small coastline on the Red Sea while South Sudan is landlocked.  The Nile River runs through 
both countries, where the Blue and White Nile tributaries divide and run further into Ethiopia 
and Uganda respectively.39  Sudan is a majority Arab and majority Muslim Country with 
approximately 45.5 million people.  South Sudan has multiple ethnic groups but is majority 
Christian and has a population of about 10.5 million.40  Sudan is relatively arid compared to the 
fertile lands of South Sudan.  Both countries heavily rely on oil sales for their economy.  Most of 
the oil reserves in Sudan sit in the South, while the pipelines, refineries, and ports are in the 
North.  This interdependent relationship makes economic cooperation vital, but also makes 
relations more difficult.41   
 Before we consider the legitimacy of secession, we must understand the roots of South 
Sudan’s conflict with the North.  Our story begins in 1956 when Sudan received independence 
from British colonial rule. Before independence, Sudan had been a part of the Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium.  This colonial unit was jointly administered by the British and Egyptians under 
the British empire.42  In this period, Sudan had been divided into a predominantly Arab North 
region and a more Christian South.  The North, centered at Khartoum was Sudan’s 
administrative center.  The Anglo-Egyptian condominium was dismantled following the post-
World War II decolonization.  In 1956, Sudan received independence from Great Britain, and 
Egypt renounced any claims to the territory of Sudan.  Still, the administrative distinctions 
 
39 “Africa :: South Sudan — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency,” accessed December 10, 2020. 
40 “Africa :: Sudan — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency,” accessed December 10, 2020. 
41 “Africa :: Sudan — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency,” accessed December 10, 2020. 
42 “Sudan Profile - Timeline,” BBC News, September 10, 2019, sec. Africa. 
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established under colonial rule remained.  The North remained the center of power and refused to 
share this with the South. 
Following independence, Sudan went through much internal conflict.  The government 
would see multiple coups and a rise of Islamism.  One major conflict during this period was with 
the Anya Nya Movement in the South.43  The Sudanese government favored Arabs and Islam by 
placing repressive restrictions on the Christian south.  Therefore, the southern-based Anya Nya 
movement used violent means to seek concessions and autonomy for the south from the northern 
rule.  This conflict ended with the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement that provided the South 
autonomy and some protections.  The seeds of conflict were laid again in 1978 by the discovery 
of large oil reserves primarily in southern Sudan.44  In 1983 the Sudanese government in 
Khartoum ended southern autonomy and began expropriating fertile farmland in the south.  
Furthermore, the Sudanese regime implemented Sharia Law. All of these actions violated the 
1972 Addis Ababa agreement.  The result was a new rebellion under the banner of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).45  This conflict would last until 2005. 
After decades of civil war, the Sudanese government and SPLM/A finally engaged in 
peace talks.  These talks culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  This 
agreement provided autonomy for the south along with clarity on sharing oil revenues.  
However, the most relevant part of the treaty was the requirement that a referendum would be 
held in the South on whether to secede or not.  This referendum was held in January 2011 and 
South Sudan became an independent state in July 2011.46 
 
43 “Sudan - The Growth of National Consciousness,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed December 10, 2020. 
44 “Sudan Profile - Timeline,” BBC News, September 10, 2019, sec. Africa. 
45 Girma Kebbede, “Sudan: The North-South Conflict in Historical Perspective” 15 (1997), pg. 9. 
46 Marina Ottaway Hamzawy Amr, “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, January 4, 2012. 
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South Sudan’s secession illustrates the intricacy of civil wars and how they can be ended.  
The complexity of weighing the interests of the North and South, along with the past injustices 
and cultural divides make it ripe for an interesting discussion.  Thus, we can pose the question: 
Was South Sudanese secession justified? 
 Under the framework for secession that I have defended, the answer is: yes, South 
Sudan’s secession is justified.  To apply my framework, we must answer two simple questions: 
“Was there a state that held legitimate control over the territory?” and “did its government agree 
to cede that territory?”  The Sudanese government held the territory of Sudan legitimately after 
the decolonization by the British and the renouncement of claims by the Egyptians.  The state of 
Sudan would retain these rights until they chose to abdicate them. Thus, when the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement laid out a framework for potential independence in the south, 
Sudan agreed to cede its territorial claims to a new government.  As long as the referendum was 
followed as defined in the agreement, then secession was morally justified. 
 Still, how does The Secession Principle compare to Buchanan, Miller, and Moore’s 
theories?  I will now illustrate why The Secession Principle performs better.  
First, Buchanan’s framework would also provide support for South Sudanese secession.  
Buchanan emphasizes just cause and the weighing of interests in determining the morality of 
secession.  Therefore, the important question is: did the South have enough injustice committed 
against them to warrant secession?  The South’s large oil reserves and fertile land made it 
economically vital for the Sudanese economy.  Thus, the interests of the people of Sudan in 
keeping the southern territory were significant.  Still, the injustices against the south outweigh 
the interests of the rump state.  Following Sudan’s independence, the Majority Arab North 
sought to use political power to restrict the rights and wealth of the south.  Whether it was laws 
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that favored Islam or the expropriation of land from South Sudanese farmers, the North 
perpetrated a plethora of injustices.  Even if there was not a direct peace treaty previously 
consenting to secession, the South Sudanese would still be justified in their independence. 
 While Buchanan does come to a similar answer as my theory, he still fails to fully 
account for the interests of the people of Sudan.  Since the majority of the Sudanese economy 
relies on oil exports, the loss of these oil fields brings harm to both the government of Sudan and 
the people.  Thus, the bar is incredibly high for conceiving of a moral secession.  While it is 
undeniable that the Sudanese government committed serious injustices, there are alternatives to 
secession.  As the 1972 Addis Abba agreement illustrates, the potential respect for southern 
autonomy could bring about peace.  Thus, a unilateral rebellion by the south to enforce this 
autonomy could replace secession as a tool to prevent injustices.  These alternatives for 
achieving peace mean a preemptive declaration of secession by the people of South Sudan 
without Sudanese consent would unfairly strip away Sudan’s primary economic export.  While 
Buchanan is right to justify unilateral actions by the South to protect their liberties and 
autonomy, the potential for a unilateral declaration of secession means the interests of both 
parties would not be fully respected.   
 Second, Miller’s framework provides ambiguous opposition to South Sudan’s secession.  
Miller endows a nation of commonly identifying people with long-standing ties to the land the 
right to secede through self-determination.  Miller defines a nation as a group of individuals with 
obligations to each other, who perceive themselves as in the same group, and seek personal 
autonomy through shared culture, history, etc.…. Since the people of South Sudan have been 
there for centuries and the referendum expressed their decision to leave Sudan, to determine 
whether South Sudan justly seceded, we must see if the people of South Sudan fit these criteria.   
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First, the group must have obligations to each other.  During the past civil wars with the 
North, there was a clear sense of unity among groups.  Moreover, the common Christian identity 
further united the people in South Sudan.47  The shared suffering at the hands of the North united 
different ethnic groups in the SPLM/A and illustrated a clear perception of obligations to one 
another.  
Second, the groups would have to see themselves as a part of the same group.  The 
south’s diverse ethnic groups maintained some unity due to the common opposition to the north 
and religious similarities.48  While South Sudan remained within Sudan, the south could be 
considered to see themselves with a common identity.  However, once independent, this unity 
collapsed.  This lack of ethnic unification could lead to two different interpretations.  One could 
say the basic identity developed in opposition to the north would fulfill Miller’s criteria.  
However, one could state the lack of unified recognized groups implies that the people of South 
Sudan are not truly a nation. Depending on the analytical context, one can argue in different 
ways whether the South Sudanese people perceive themselves as within the same group. 
The last question is whether individuals seek personal autonomy through shared culture, 
history, ect…  This again depends on the context you are analyzing.  Within the State of Sudan, 
the shared religion seems to imply that the people of Sudan are a distinct nation within Sudan.  
But, without the common enemy, the people of South Sudan maintain separate ethnic and 
communal divisions.  Thus, it is not clear if the South Sudanese fit David Miller’s conception of 
a nation.  If looking within the context of the state of Sudan, then they are.  If it is a post-
secession South Sudanese state, then there is compelling evidence that they are not one nation.    
 
47 “South Sudan - The World Factbook,” accessed January 10, 2021. 
48 “South Sudan - The World Factbook,” accessed January 10, 2021. 
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 This ambiguity illustrates that a primary failing of David Miller’s framework is the 
ambiguity in applying the definition of a nation.  Depending on the context of analysis, one could 
see the South Sudanese people either as a nation or not.  In the context of the Sudanese State, 
there are compelling arguments for conceiving South Sudan as a nation, while independent of 
dominance from the North there are not.  The ethnic in the south divisions were merely papered 
over while the groups were part of Sudan.  The subsequent South Sudanese civil war between the 
primary ethnic groups, Dinka and Nuer, crystallizes the difficulty of defining a legitimate 
governing body as a nation.  By eschewing the definition of nations, my theory avoids the 
ambiguity of Miller.  
 Finally, Moore’s framework would be supportive of South Sudanese secession.  Despite 
the previously mentioned ethnic divisions in the South, the people in South Sudan would still 
constitute a “people” in Moore’s eyes.  This is because the group living in South Sudan 
maintained a similar political interest and had a claim to the land that they lived, farmed, and 
worked on.  Thus, the political union of individuals in South Sudan endowed them with the 
group right to secede.  Since the 2011 referendum represented South Sudan’s desire for 
independence, they justly seceded.  
Moreover, South Sudan’s secession from Sudan exemplifies Moore’s principle of 
reciprocity.  To avoid the harm caused by a unilateral secession to individuals in the rump state, 
Moore sees the maintenance of current economic agreements as imperative.  The 2005 
Comprehensive Agreement ensured that oil revenues be shared and current pipelines were 
maintained.  Thus, despite the act of self-determination in the 2011 referendum, the harms that 
could have befallen the people of Sudan were avoided. 
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Still, South Sudan illustrates that my Secession Principle performs better than Margaret 
Moore’s because it accomplishes the same goal with less complexity.  Specifically, Margaret 
Moore's principle of reciprocity adds unnecessary complexity.  The boundaries between Sudan 
and South Sudan were not always clear, and the economic reliance on each other might make 
secession seem unjustified.  How could the Sudanese be forced to sacrifice most of their oil 
reserves, and how could the people of South Sudan lose their port?  The truth is that these 
considerations are important but not necessary for secession under my framework.  Since the 
agreement laying the framework for secession was mutual, the important economic ties between 
the two countries would ostensibly be worked out.  If they were not, then the failure would have 
been due to bad negotiations, not a unilateral act of secession.  Both Sudan and South Sudan 
retain the prerogative to harm themselves.  Although it would not be advisable, since the 
governments of both sides maintain the ability to make decisions for the collective, they are not 
inclined to maintain economic ties with the rump state because the secession was recognized by 
both states.  Moore’s emphasis on reciprocity is unnecessary for secession because it is 
multilateral and inherently requires some level of agreement from both sides. 
Both Moore or Miller require complex analyses of who constitutes a nation and thus 
justify South Sudan's secession. However, the constitutional issue is irrelevant for questions of 
boundaries of states.  Since states are longstanding political institutions not made for a specific 
ethnic or religious group, the changes in boundaries do not concern the particular identities of 
people.   Instead, my reason for supporting South Sudanese secession comes plainly from the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, which outlines the process to achieve secession.  By 
affirming that a referendum would be held six years from the agreement and that Sudan would 
recognize South Sudan if it seceded, the subsequent secession is justified to both parties.   
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Buchanan, Miller, and Moore would all see the vote in 2011 as an act of declaring 
independence.  However, this is not the case.  Secession was justified not because of the 
referendum's result, but rather because of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  This 
agreement, as discussed above, established federalization, disarmament, and oil sharing.  But, the 
most important part of the agreement was that it required a referendum on secession in 6 years.49  
In this, the North agreed to respect secession and recognize the South as a separate state if the 
referendum favored secession.  Without this agreement, a referendum in the South would not 
have mattered, since the North likely would not have recognized it.  Therefore, South Sudan was 
a justified secession wherein the rump state of Sudan ceded its claim to the territory in the south. 
Furthermore, South Sudan’s use of violence before the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
of 2005 illustrates the legitimate application of Allen Buchanan's Just Cause theory.  While 
Buchanan’s framework does not comply with the high bar necessary to limit secession, it does 
give a good understanding of when violence can be used to justify autonomy or secession.  The 
people of South Sudan had been oppressed by the North, with wealth expropriation, 
implementation of Sharia law, and elimination of their political representation.  These acts would 
pass Buchanan's bar for justifying secession.  But I am arguing that they would not be sufficient.  
Secession can only be justified through recognition, not a unilateral declaration.  Instead, the 
response to oppression that Buchanan lays out justifies a rebellion to protect one’s rights.  While 
they could not unilaterally declare secession, they could engage in revolution fighting for 
autonomy.  In doing so, the Anya Nya and later the SPLM/A engaged in a justified rebellion to 
defend their interests as a last resort.  Moreover, the agreement of Addis Abba and the 
declaration of autonomy for the South in 1972 and later in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
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illustrate the just results of a conflict wherein secession was not agreed to.  Thus, we not only see 
South Sudan’s secession as justified, but the initial use of violence to defend interests was also 
supported.50 
 Ultimately, South Sudan illustrates a case of justified secession, because the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement fulfilled the recognition and agreement conditions required to 
justify secession.  Although South Sudan's government initially failed, the state and its 
boundaries remained recognized and intact.  In effect, the proper process was followed and 
although the success of this process can be debated, the legitimacy is clear. 
B. Taiwan 
The second case we will consider grapples with the issue of Taiwanese sovereignty and 
the legality of potential secession.  Taiwan is becoming a hot zone, with the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping hoping to bring it under the control of China.  The Chinese government remains 
aggressive in defending its claims to sovereignty over the island, threatening to go to war to 
prevent any attempt at secession.  A high-ranking People's Liberation Army general, Li 
Zuocheng stated in regards to Taiwan: 
If the possibility for peaceful reunification is lost, the people's armed forces will, with the whole nation, including 
the people of Taiwan, take all necessary steps to resolutely smash any separatist plots or actions.51 
 
The Chinese government's bellicose statements indicate a desire to prevent Taiwanese secession 
and enforce their claims to vital sea lanes in East Asia.   
 Just as the Chinese government seeks reunification, the people of Taiwan are increasingly 
identifying as distinctly Taiwanese.  In 2018, a study by the National Chengchi University found 
 
50 It is important to note here that the actions taken by the SPLM/A and Any Nya movement were not always within 
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51 Yew Lun Tian, "Attack on Taiwan an Option to Stop Independence, Top China General Says | Reuters," May 28, 
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that 55% of Taiwanese people identify as Taiwanese, 38% as both Chinese and Taiwanese, and 
4% as exclusively Chinese.  These numbers changed significantly when compared to 1995 when 
the respective numbers were 20%, 45%, and 26%.52 With the Chinese Communist government 
committed to preventing secession the Taiwanese government now seeks to defend its declared 
sovereignty.  Some in Taiwan argue the best way to do so is through secession. However, this 
poses a host of questions. First, would Taiwan be justified in seceding?  Second, would the 
Peoples Republic of China be permitted to use violence to prevent Taiwanese secession?  
Finally, would the United States or foreign powers be morally justified in defending Taiwan 
from the PRC attempting forceful reunification?  We will examine here the implications of 
Buchanan, Miller, Moore, and The Secession Principle for answering these questions. 
It may be best to begin with a description of the geography of Taiwan and the history of 
its relationship to China.  Taiwan is an island that sits about 100 miles off the coast of China.53  
Taiwan lies at an important junction for maritime trade for major economies, such as Japan, 
South Korea, China, and the Philippines.54  This geography makes it strategically valuable to 
whoever controls it.   
 The relevant history of Taiwan specifically begins when it was still a small island, 
populated by aboriginal groups.  In the late 1600s, the Qing Dynasty (the rulers of China) 
annexed Taiwan.  Despite contestation, over time the Qing dynasty was recognized as the 
legitimate holder of the territory of Taiwan.  The Qing Dynasty's possession of Taiwan ended 
following the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895.  In the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki, the 
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Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan.55  Taiwan remained Japanese territory until the end of 
World War II when the defeated Japanese were forced to return the Taiwanese territory to the 
Republic of China (ROC).  These handovers illustrate that the territory of Taiwan can be 
legitimately transferred between states, but it requires recognition from the current legitimate 
possessor. 
Moreover, before continuing the discussion of Taiwanese secession, we must comment 
on the history of the Chinese government in the 20th century.  In 1911 the Qing dynasty was 
overthrown in a revolution, ending the imperial system in China.  Following that revolution, a 
strong central government did not form.  This led to a period of decentralization and competing 
warlords within the state of China.56  By the late 1920s, the Nationalist Kuomintang Party 
(KMT) in conjunction with the communists began to fight warlords to re-establish a centralized 
government known as the Republic of China.  This was followed by a purge of communists by 
the KMT and a subsequent rebellion, leading to a Chines Civil War.  This war was disrupted in 
1931 by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.  To resist the Japanese invasion, the KMT and 
Communists paused the civil war.  This conflict would eventually become wrapped into World 
War II, which ended in a Japanese defeat.  The Chinese Civil war then restarted, and in 1949 the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong claimed victory.57  They established the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and claimed to be the legitimate government of the entire 
Chinese State.  After the KMT's defeat, the remaining KMT members fled to Taiwan and 
established a rival government claiming to be the legitimate government of China called the 
Republic of China (ROC).   
 
55 Susan V Lawrence and Wayne M Morrison, "Taiwan: Issues for Congress," pg. 2 - 3. 
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Here, the territory of Taiwan reaches a level of stasis.  Both the PRC and ROC claim to 
be the legitimate government of all of China, with the specter of conflict remaining.  The 
conflicting claims to authority in China become a point of contention during the Cold War.  The 
United States recognized the ROC and the Soviet Union recognized the PRC.  Over time, the 
PRC solidified its position on the mainland territory making the restoration of the ROC unlikely. 
In the 1970s the United States wanted to improve relations with the PRC, which resulted in the 
United States recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of China.  Still, the U.S. did not 
abandon Taiwan, continuing to provide aid and an implied security guarantee to the ROC against 
a PRC invasion.  This policy of recognizing the PRC but preventing forceful reunification with 
Taiwan was called the "One China Policy."  
Two major events, 1992 affected the Taiwan question: the democratization of Taiwan 
and the consensus “One China Principle.”  First, the Taiwanese government held their first open 
parliamentary elections, which brought in new voices that were not necessarily aligned with 
retaking control over all of China.  Second, through semi-official organizations, the PRC and 
ROC semi-endorsed a consensus "One-China Principle".58 This principle claims that while the 
ROC and PRC may differ on their interpretations of who governs this territory, there is only one 
State of China and it includes Taiwan.59   This consensus theoretically prevents unilateral 
secession by Taiwan. Still, the “One-China Principle” has only been adopted by semi-official 
organizations under the ROC and PRC but is not official ROC policy. 
In 2005, the PRC passed an Anti-secession law.  The law empowers China to respond to 
any attempt at secession with force.  Thus, the PRC would not actively seek to bring Taiwan 
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under their governance, but it would fight any attempts at secession.60  The PRC’s aggressive 
policy towards Taiwan maintains the specter of conflict.  In the 2010s, two nationalist leaders 
came to power that set the stage for the ROC and PRC to enter into conflict.  In 2012, Xi Jinping 
ascended the Presidency of the PRC.61  Deeply committed to expanding Chinese geopolitical 
influence, he has focused on bringing Taiwan under the PRC.  In Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen was 
elected President at the head of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  As younger Taiwanese 
citizens increasingly perceive themselves as distinctly Taiwanese, the DPP has gained political 
support to affirm Taiwanese sovereignty.62  Although many don't expect President Tsai Ing-wen 
to attempt secession, she has no interest in submitting to PRC governance. 
With this history of Taiwan and its relationship to the Chinese State in mind, we can 
apply my framework of secession to a potential claim of secession by Taiwan.  The philosophers 
we discussed previously would take different approaches.  First, David Miller might see the 
rising cultural distinction by the Taiwanese people as an important factor in determining whether 
secession is justified. Through decades of separation and increasingly separate identity, the 
people in Taiwan have established just separation and possession of the island of Taiwan.  
Therefore, the people of Taiwan could utilize their right to self-determination and secede.  
Moreover, since they have a representative democratic government that protects minority rights, 
Miller’s argument suggests that secession would be just if chosen by the Taiwanese people.   
Second, Allen Buchanan might ask whether the territory of Taiwan has been justly 
treated by the Chinese State.  The Chinese government has attacked Taiwan in the past, 
including shelling and threats of invasion.  Moreover, the authoritarian regime of the PRC has 
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taken aggressive actions to suppress dissent in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang that seeks to 
destroy their independent and unique cultures.63   Thus, the Taiwanese would have the right to 
secede to defend their rights and prevent Chinese injustice.  Buchanan might be interpreted as 
opposing secession because unjust actions have not occurred yet against Taiwan from China.  
Still, the 2005 Anti-secession law, the re-education camps in Xinjiang, and the recent destruction 
of Hong Kong sovereignty provide ample support for the concern that China will impose unjust 
actions on the people of Taiwan.  Since Buchanan’s goal is for countries to achieve just 
governance, secession is a way to prevent unjust authority based on a legitimate expectation of 
injustice. 
Finally, Margaret Moore might look at the unification around a similar politically united 
group.  Since the people of Taiwan perceive themselves as a politically united group of 
individuals with their own government, then Moore would support a legitimate attempt at 
secession.  While Taiwan would be required to maintain reciprocal agreements with the people 
of China, Moore would see the Taiwanese people having a right to secede through an act of self-
determination.   
While individuals can interpret Buchanan, Miller, and Moore differently, it is clear that 
there are legitimate grounds within each framework to justify secession by Taiwan if they chose 
to declare it unilaterally.  However, I will argue that this is the incorrect conclusion, and Taiwan 
would not be morally justified in unilaterally seceding.   
In contrast to Miller, Buchanan, and Moore, my framework does not require complex and 
subjective determinations.  Instead, we need only to ask two simple questions: Which State was 
previously recognized as the legitimate possessor of Taiwan?  And has the government of that 
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state ceded its claims to that territory?  The answer to these questions lies within the history 
discussed above.  Although the initial annexation by the Qing dynasty in the late 1600s was done 
through force, and thus it is debatable whether it was initially just, the Chinese State's possession 
was eventually recognized by past claimants.  In 1895, Taiwan became part of the State of 
Japan’s territory.  The territorial rights were not possessed by the Chinese State but by the 
Japanese state.  Then, in 1945 the Japanese returned the territory to the Chinese state.  No 
territorial change has since occurred and Taiwan remains under the domain of the State of China.  
 Second, based on the discussion above, the government functionally controlling the non-
Taiwanese territory of the State of China is the PRC.  The PRC has made it clear through the 
1992 One China Policy that it has not agreed to cede the State of China's claims to Taiwan.  
Therefore, if the ROC were to declare Taiwan an independent state, countries should only treat 
this as an attempt to seek secession.  It is not sufficient to justify treating Taiwan as an 
independent state.  Unless the PRC recognizes Taiwan as an independent state, Taiwan must not 
be perceived or recognized as a state endowed with Territorial rights.  If other countries were to 
recognize Taiwanese sovereignty, it would violate the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
Instead, the ROC should be treated as a de facto government of the Taiwanese territory.  
It represents the inhabitants, can make laws, and field armies to defend them. Still, it does not 
carry with it the right to prevent immigration from mainland China or enforce territorial claims 
not associated with the Chinese State.  Moreover, infringements on the territory of Taiwan 
should be perceived as infringements on China as a whole.  Thus, the PRC would be justified in 
defending the territory of Taiwan from any invasion under the framework of Just War Theory. 
Although the ROC's de facto governance of Taiwan prevents the PRC from claiming to 
be the legitimate government of the entire Chinese State, Taiwan remains a piece of territory 
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within China.  Thus, the people living in China and Taiwan have a right to trade and live within 
Taiwan.  Also, the ROC and PRC cannot restrict the movement and trade of Chinese people 
beyond reasonable regulation.   
If ROC were to declare Taiwan an independent state, then they would not be justified in 
doing so because they are not entitled to unilaterally harm Chinese people left in the rump state. 
Unlike Miller, Buchanan, and Moore, my theory respects both the rights of the people living 
under the PRC and Taiwan to remain within one state, even if they are governed by different 
entities.  Ultimately, the One China Policy supported by the PRC and the United States correctly 
describes the current territorial state of China under my framework.  There are disagreements 
over the legitimacy of the government of China, but the state at the core of the ROC and PRC's 
areas of governance persists.  Still, one part of the One China Policy remains illegitimate, and 
that is the PRC's claim that secession is perpetually illegal.  Although Taiwan is currently in the 
state of China, that is not necessarily a permanent condition.  As illustrated by the transfer of 
Taiwan to the Japanese in 1895, the state in control of territory is not permanent.  It can change 
hands when the government inhabiting the state not seceding chooses to relinquish territory.  
Pursuits of secession can still be justified.  My framework does not preclude Taiwanese people 
from seeking secession through peaceful means.  Exercising their natural liberties, the Taiwanese 
people can choose to seek negotiated secession.  While they cannot unilaterally declare 
independence, if they receive recognition of the PRC, then they can secede.   
Next, let us ask what the ROC and PRC can justifiably do in response to a claim to 
secession.  Could the PRC justifiably use force to retake control over Taiwan or suppress 
attempts at secession?  Or is the ROC justified in using force to defend itself?  The legitimacy of 
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using force in response or pursuit of secession depends on how the PRC seeks reunification or 
the ROC chooses to secede.  So, we will imagine a few scenarios.   
An important caveat to make before diving deeper into the discussion requires us to 
address the realist retort that morality should not play a role in the decisions of states.  The PRC, 
ROC, and United States all have pragmatic interests in maintaining security, economic 
prosperity, and geopolitical standing.  I do not mean for the discussion of morality to totally 
replace these considerations.  Instead, the moral limitations on actions by the states should 
provide a framework that complements pragmatic considerations. 
First, imagine the ROC wants to unilaterally declare secession.  In doing so, the ROC 
then attacks PRC military positions to pre-empt an invasion.  In this case, the PRC would have a 
legitimate interest in preventing secession and a just cause to protect against pre-emptive attacks 
from the ROC.  Therefore, the PRC would be justified in this scenario in using force.  Still, there 
are obvious limitations to options to maintain the unity of the State of China.  They could not 
justifiably use indiscriminate violence or terror against the people of Taiwan, but military options 
to remove top leadership and enforce the State of China's claims would be justified.64 
Or consider a second scenario: Suppose the ROC wants to negotiate secession and to 
gauge support of the population, it gives a referendum to the people.  In this case, the ROC and 
its constituents are exercising their liberties to voice an opinion and peacefully negotiate 
secession.  As discussed above, the 2005 Anti-Secession Law provides the Peoples Liberation 
Army (PLA) the ability to suppress secession attempts by Taiwan.  If Taiwan attempted to hold a 
referendum to assess support for secession or seek negotiations with the Chinese for 
independence, the PRC's military would likely invade Taiwan or utilize economic restrictions to 
 
64 While I cannot fully address Jus in Bello during secession, I highly recommend future discussion on the topic. 
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coerce submission.65  While the PRC would be justified in using force to prevent unilateral 
secession, the people of Taiwan also have a legitimate interest in avoiding oppression.   
Individuals and groups within a state are justified in defending against oppression, 
whether it be external or internal.  People can commit a revolution to break the entire 
government or expel unjust authority from a particular piece of territory while still not seceding.  
Revolution justified the PRC in taking power in 1949 over mainland China, but it also permits 
the inhabitants of Taiwan to protect their autonomy in response to oppressive actions. The use of 
force by the Chinese government to stop peaceful pushes for recognized secession in Taiwan 
would be seen as an act of oppression.  Despite being within the same state, the ROC would be 
justified in utilizing its security forces to defend against the PRC aggression.  The use of force to 
achieve or defeat secession requires a just cause. Without just cause, the two sides must instead 
seek peaceful negotiation.  While my framework of secession provides the potential rump state 
with much protection against unilateral secession, it must not be misconstrued to support the use 
of unwarranted violence. 
Finally, what can the United States or other countries do to prevent the PRC from 
oppressing the people of Taiwan?  Well, there are two options: they could provide aid to the 
ROC, or they could intervene on humanitarian grounds.  Providing military aid to the ROC does 
not violate the sovereignty of the Chinese state.  United States government and its people have 
the right to engage in commerce with individuals, as long as they abide by the laws of the 
government within the territory.  In Taiwan, the government is not the PRC but the ROC, and 
thus if the ROC allows the United States to sell or give weapons, then it is permissible for the 
United States to do so.   
 
65 Yew Lun Tian, "Attack on Taiwan an Option to Stop Independence, Top China General Says | Reuters." 
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This is exactly what the United States has done.  The Taiwan Relations Act provides the 
U.S. the ability to sell weapons to bolster Taiwanese defense.  While this Act does not recognize 
Taiwan in an official capacity, it does permit the U.S. to trade and cooperate with the ROC in an 
unofficial capacity.66  The United States on humanitarian grounds has the right to ensure that a 
group can defend themselves and their basic liberties.  Coming to the defense of Taiwan remains 
an acceptable act under my framework of secession.  Taiwan, under the Taiwan Relations Act, is 
not officially a country but a region of the Chinese State that exists under a different government.  
Still, it is justifiable for individuals to trade and negotiate with this different government and the 
ROC has the right to purchase weapons to defend itself from potential aggression. 
 Moreover, the United States can intervene to defend the people of Taiwan in the case of a 
unilateral PRC invasion.  Currently, the United States provides an ambiguous security guarantee 
to Taiwan.  While it is not a treaty obligation, the United States will still defend the Taiwanese 
from unilateral Chinese aggression.67 Assessing whether the security guarantee is permissible 
under my framework depends largely on how a conflict between the ROC and PRC began.  If 
Taiwan unilaterally chose to declare independence, then the PRC would have justification to 
enforce the Chinese State’s claims to prevent secession.  However, absent a declaration of 
independence, a unilateral PRC invasion would provide more leeway for the United States to act. 
If Taiwan was invaded by the Chinese, it would eventually fall.  Based on past repressive actions 
in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, Chinese conquest would likely repress the Taiwanese identity and 
political rights.68  Therefore, based on the humanitarian grounds of preventing oppression, the 
United States would be justified in intervening on behalf of the Taiwanese.  This intervention 
 
66 Susan V Lawrence and Wayne M Morrison, "Taiwan: Issues for Congress," pg. 9. 
67 Susan V Lawrence and Wayne M Morrison, “Taiwan: Issues for Congress,” pg. 9. 
68 “World Report 2021: Rights Trends in China,” Human Rights Watch, January 13, 2021. 
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would be justified as a defense of human rights.  Considering that the United States and other 
countries can legitimately seek to ensure norms and stability across the world, other countries do 
have the right to intervene to protect against violation of human rights.  Still, the United States 
would not be intervening on behalf of seeking Taiwanese independence.  Instead, it would be 
engaged in support on behalf of the Taiwanese people, not a state of Taiwan.  The ambiguous 
security guarantee of the United States is justified on the grounds of ensuring Taiwanese rights, 
but intervention would be unjustified if an invasion was caused by unilateral secession. 
 Still, it is important to note that the actions prescribed above relate to moral justifications.  
An important caveat is to recognize that there are pragmatic political actions that might lead the 
United States to defend Taiwan.  The morality of an action is based on a set of norms that should 
be followed, but in exceptional cases, the norms might need to be violated for practical purposes.  
The Taiwanese case study is a further justification of my framework of Secession.  My 
framework simply and clearly implies that Taiwan cannot unilaterally secede.  In effect, there are 
two governments within the singular State of China.  The de facto consensus reached in 1992 
supports my framework.  The One China Policy appears to be for now the best way to maintain 
stability in the region.  It both recognizes the legitimacy of individuals within a state to seek 
governmental autonomy while recognizing that the state itself remains intact.  All of these 
competing interests are maintained without a complex analysis of cultural or political 
differences.  Nor does determining the legitimacy of secession require subjective looks at what 
actions taken by the government are oppressive.  In this sense, my theory accounts for the 
liberties of the Taiwanese people to call for secession, but also the PRC's interests in maintaining 




 Ultimately, secession is justified if and only if the rump state agrees to cede its claim to 
the territory of the new state.  While The Secession Principle seems simple and obvious, it 
creates a framework for determining justifiable secession.  By emphasizing the act of multi-party 
agreement, we can see that states and governments themselves are at their core functions of 
agreement.  Thus, by discussing when a new state is made, we gain a greater understanding of 
the foundations of the state itself. 
 Importantly, The Secession Principle raises the bar for secession to fully account for the 
rights of the rump state and its citizens.  Unlike past theories, the Secessionist Principle 
recognizes the severity of secession.  Unlike revolution, rebellion, or emigration, secession 
permanently removes the citizens of the rump state’s ability to freely move, engage in 
commerce, and utilize the resources of the seceding territory.  Secession’s goal is to appropriate 
territory, and this is a more durable change than the liberation of a group of people.  By ensuring 
that all parties recognize a change in territory, the rights of the would-be secessionists are 
accounted for.  
 Still, there is much discussion still to be had.  In particular, the discussion of just war in 
pursuit of secession should be further discussed.  As stated in the paper, there is a difference 
between being justified in pursuing secession and using violence to pursue independence.  
Anyone can advocate for seceding, but there are few cases when violence can be justified. While 
my theory provides the groundwork for understanding when violence is justified, it still could be 
further fleshed out in future papers.  This discussion can be further taken into the broader attempt 
to reconcile just war theory with non-state actors. 
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Moreover, while some may disregard this discussion as purely theoretical, the case 
studies illustrate the applicability to modern examples of secession.  While there are pragmatic 
issues that need to be considered, countries must also consider whether to support or combat a 
group’s secessionist claims.  A framework of moral understanding can provide guidelines and 
boundaries for these considerations.  If the international community can understand when 
secession is justified, it can be more consistent and clearer when arbitrating disputes.  
Furthermore, since my theory at its core recognizes that agreement and recognition are 
paramount to stability, it better permits pragmatic diplomacy to create outcomes. 
Along with secession, the principle of secession I propose in this paper takes on a much 
larger role in determining border disputes between countries.  Whether it be Kashmir, the South 
China Sea, Crimea, or many others, The Secession Principle provides a clear guideline for 
international arbitrators to assess the efficacy of opposing claims.  In doing so, I hope this essay 
can add to the discussion of territorial boundaries and further establishment of norms for 
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